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Bankruptcy for the Poor?
Abstract

The conventional wisdom is that the poor are not heavy users of the insolvency system, because creditors are
unwilling to take risks on the poor and because many of the poor are judgment-proof. However, credit is now
widely available across the spectrum of income groups. In addition, poverty is often a temporary state for
many Canadians; therefore, being judgment-proof is likewise temporary. Some of those who are poor at any
point in time are in fact in need of bankruptcy protection. They have debts that they are unable to pay and
little likelihood of being able to repay in the near future. We begin by presenting evidence on indebtedness
among families in the lower income deciles. We then turn to the main question: should the Canadian
bankruptcy process be more readily available to poor debtors? Following a comparative analysis (considering
the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom) and analysis of interviews with
Canadian bankruptcy trustees and other insolvency professionals, we offer six recommendations for reform.
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BANKRUPTCY FOR THE POOR?©
STEPHANIE BEN-ISHAI* & SAUL SCHWARTZ"*
The conventional wisdom is that the poor are not
heavy users of the insolvency system, because creditors are
unwilling to take risks on the poor and because many of the
poor are judgment-proof.
However, credit is now widely available across the
spectrum of income groups. In addition, poverty is often a
temporary state for many Canadians; therefore, being
judgment-proof islikewise temporary. Some of those who are
poor at any point in time are in fact in need of bankruptcy
protection. They have debts that they are unable to pay and
little likelihood of being able to repay in the near future.
We begin by presenting evidence on indebtedness
among families in the lower income deciles. We then turn
to the main question: should the Canadian bankruptcy
process be more readily available to poor debtors?
Following a comparative analysis (considering the United
States, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom)
and analysis of interviews with Canadian bankruptcy
trustees and other insolvency professionals, we offer six
recommendations for reform.

La sagesse traditionnelle veut que les pauvres ne
soient pas d'importants usagers du syst~me d'insolvabilit6
car les cr6anciers ne dfisirent pas prendre de risques i leur
6gard, 6tant donn6 qu'un grand nombre d'entre eux font
preuve de manque de jugement.
Toutefois, 16 cr6dit est actuellement largement
disponible pour une vaste fourchette de groupes de revenus.
En outre, la pauvretd est souvent un 6tat temporaire pour
nombre de Canadiens, cc qui indique que le manque de
discemement est 6galement temporaire. Certains de ceux
qui sont pauvres h un moment donn6 ont en r6alitd besoin
d'une protection contre la faillite. Ils sont endett6s, mais
incapables de payer, et il est peu probable qu'ils soient en
mesure de rembourser dans un avenir proche.
A la suite d'une analyse comparative (qui examine
les Etats-Unis, I'Australie, la Nouvelle-Zklande et le
Royaume-Uni) et d'une analyse des entrevues men6es
aupr~s de syndics de faillite canadiens et d'autres
professionnels du domaine de l'insolvabilit6, nous offrons
six recommandations pour entreprendre une r6forme.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Bankruptcy need not be synonymous with poverty. Indeed, in
North America, consumer bankruptcy is a middle-class phenomenon,
with debtors filing for bankruptcy from a wide array of occupations and
income levels. Filing for bankruptcy requires a few thousand dollars in
out-of-pocket costs in Canada and the United States. Most of those
considering bankruptcy can afford to pay, drawing upon either their
earnings or their friends and family.
Our concern here is with debtors who need bankruptcy but who
cannot afford to pay the required costs of filing. We will call them "poor
debtors," and the first task is to define what we mean by this term. As part
of the research for this article, we conducted semi-structured interviews
with a number of Canadian bankruptcy trustees.' We asked each of these
'Information on the interviewees can be found in Appendix I. Bankruptcy trustees in Canada
are the private intermediaries (often accountants) who are regulated and licensed by the Office of the
Superintendent of Bankruptcy (OSB) and serve as gatekeepers to the consumer bankruptcy process.
Given the ethical, privacy, and cost restrictions, we chose to interview trustees instead of "poor debtors"
for the purposes of this study. Future work may involve more in-depth interviews with "poor debtors."
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trustees to characterize those who could not pay their normal fees, and
found that the trustees shared a common vision. As one trustee put it:
"These are people who live a marginal existence, on social assistance, living
in government-subsidized housing and with no prospects for changing this
around."2 That same trustee stated that such debtors have "no income, no
friends, no family" and are "by themselves and at the end of their rope."
Others spoke of debtors with physical or cognitive disabilities,3 or of lone
mothers who are immigrants with limited ability to speak English or French.4
Women seem to figure prominently among "poor debtors," most likely
reflecting the feminization of poverty that has occurred in recent decades.
In our view, the defining characteristic of "poor debtors" is the
strong likelihood that they will experience persistent poverty, with or
without their debts. They are not using the bankruptcy system to
discharge their debts and then move on to a comfortable middle-class
existence. We use the term "poor debtors" to refer to debtors seeking
bankruptcy who cannot pay the fees associated with filing and who seem
unlikely to attain anything but a low income for the foreseeable future.
Poor debtors should be distinguished from so-called no-income,
no-asset (NINA) debtors.' In the Canadian context, NINA debtors have
no non-exempt assets to liquidate and no income above the Low Income
Cut-offs (LICOS) calculated by Statistics Canada.6 Estimates suggest that
70 to 80% of bankruptcies in Canada are filed by NINA debtors. Most of
these debtors, however, are able to pay the normal trustee fees. They
have financial difficulties, but the depth of their poverty is far less than
that of the debtors described above.
In this article, we address several questions concerning the
situation of poor debtors in the Canadian context. First, how common is
2 Interview with Trustee 4, 15 September 2006.
3

Interview with Trustee 5, 20 September 2006.
4Interview with Trustee 1, 18 August 2006.
'Inthe deliberations of the OSB's Personal Insolvency Task Force some five years ago, there
was substantial discussion on the idea of creating a new and simpler insolvency procedure for NINA
debtors. In the end, it was decided that a streamlined version of the existing summary administration
procedure would adequately address the issue.
'Discussions about NINA debtors in Canada often refer not to those with incomes below the
LICO but to those with income below the Surplus Income guidelines issued by the OSB. See e.g. the 2007
guidelines: Canada, OSB, Directive No. llR, "Surplus Income" (27 January 2007), online:<http://strategis.
ic.gc.ca/epic/site/bsf-osb.nsf/en/brOl055e.html#appA>. Bankrupts with incomes higher than these guidelines
are deemed to have "surplus income" and must make extra payments to their creditors. The Surplus
Income guidelines, however, are based on the LICO calculated by Statistics Canada. See Ivan P. Fellegi
(Chief Statistician of Canada), "On poverty and low income," September 1997, online: Statistics Canada
< http://www.statcan.ca/english/research /13F0027XIE/13F0027XIE1999001 .htm >.
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it for low-income Canadians to have significant debts? If the poor
cannot easily borrow, it is unlikely that they will accumulate enough
debt to warrant bankruptcy. Second, do poor debtors need bankruptcy?
Many will be judgment-proof, facing no real prospect that a court would
allow their creditors to take any action against them. And third, do
existing procedures provide sufficient access to bankruptcy for poor
debtors? A Canadian government program called the Bankruptcy
Assistance Program (BAr) is available to those who cannot afford the
required fees and, as we will see, private efforts also aid such debtors.
We draw on three sources to shed light on these questions: (1)
an analysis of the 1999 Survey of FinancialSecurity a wealth survey
conducted by Statistics Canada;7 (2) the findings of our trustee
interviews; and (3) a comparative analysis of approaches adopted in the
United States, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.
These research questions go to the heart of the long-standing
debate about the ease with which debtors should be able to obtain a full
discharge of their debts through the bankruptcy process. On one side of
the debate are those who believe that the vast majority of debtors filing
bankruptcy are honest but unfortunate and seek relief from their debts
only as a distasteful last resort. Those on the other side of the debate
believe that many who file for bankruptcy could repay their debts if only
they were more diligent in their work habits and more careful in their
spending habits. These two views lead to different conclusions about any
initiative that makes bankruptcy more accessible. Those adhering to the
first view believe that greater accessibility will not dramatically increase
the numbers of debtors who file for bankruptcy, as bankruptcy is sought
only as a last resort. Those who hold to the second view believe that the
barriers to bankruptcy, both monetary and non-monetary, must be kept
high in order to discourage large numbers of debtors from seeking
bankruptcy. As we will see, this general debate spills over into the
narrower debate about the subset of debtors who have so little income
that they cannot pay the usual fees associated with bankruptcy.
Our conclusions are easily stated. We believe that the poor now
have wide access to credit, fuelled by the easy availability of credit cards,
by the ease-with which consumer durables-can be bought on credit and,
for some, by government-subsidized student loans. When the poor find
'Statistics Canada, Survey of FinancialSecurity(March 2001) prepared by Karen Maser
& Johanne Pineau, 13-595-XIE [1999 Survey ofFinancialSecurit].
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themselves unable to meet their repayment obligations, they are often
subject to intense and invasive collection efforts, even if they are
judgment-proof. Despite the efforts of some trustees in some cities to
provide bankruptcy at a reduced price,8 an unknown number of poor
debtors remain without access to bankruptcy. Moreover, the Office of
the Superintendent of Bankruptcy's (OSB) BAP is poorly designed,
poorly understood, and in great need of modernization.
II.

DO THE POOR NEED BANKRUPTCY?

In the context of consumer bankruptcy, the poor are not only
insolvent at the time of filing for bankruptcy, but are likely to have been
poor for some time and are likely to remain in poverty for the foreseeable
future. Their earning prospects are dim and their life circumstances are
such that significant barriers will impede any upward economic mobility.
However, for one of two reasons, some might question whether
the poor need bankruptcy. The first reason has already been discussed.
Many of the poor are judgment-proof and, in principle, can simply
refuse to respond to collection efforts. Nonetheless, avoiding collection
efforts is more difficult than one might think and judgment-proof debtors
frequently appear in trustees' offices seeking bankruptcy protection.
The second reason for believing that the poor do not need
bankruptcy is the idea that the poor do not accumulate very large debts
and therefore have little need for bankruptcy protection. In this section,
we use the 1999 Survey of FinancialSecurity to illustrate that the socalled "democratization of credit"-the extension of credit throughout
the income distribution-has proceeded to the point where even
families in the lowest deciles of family income have significant debts.
Tables 1 and 2 show the distribution of various kinds of debt
across the deciles of family income. Families in the bottom three deciles
almost certainly have incomes that are lower than the relevant Statistics
Canada LICO and therefore might qualify as poor by our definition. 9
Table 1 makes clear that significant proportions of the poor have
debts in each of the categories listed. To be sure, families in the lowest
'See Part 111(A), below.
'There is an important difference between the poor families in Tables 1 and 2 and poor families
as we think of them in the context of bankruptcy. In our conception, poor families seeking bankruptcy
protection are not only poor at a single point in time but are likely to remain poor for the near future.
Because there is considerable mobility in and out of poverty in Canada, a significant minority of families
in the lowest deciles of family income in Tables I and 2 are likely to move out of poverty in future years.
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three deciles are less likely to have various types of debts than those in the
higher deciles, but one in four has credit card debt (e.g., 25% in the lowest
decile) and one in six (e.g., 17% in the lowest decile) has other debts.
Since bankruptcy is a situation facing only a minority of debtors, these
proportions are large enough to suggest that a significant minority of poor
families will have significant debts coming due at a time when their
income is low. The amounts shown in Table 2 are averages only for those
who have positive amounts of debt in each category, but their size once
again suggests that poor families may acquire significant debts, especially
in relation to their low income. For example, among those in the lowest
decile with credit card debt, the average amount owed was $2,064.
We note in passing that student loan debts are an important type of
debt held by the poor, both in terms of frequency and size, and that student
loans are not dischargeable through bankruptcy. We see that the families in
the lowest decile are the most likely to hold student loans, partly because
those loans are directed to students from low-income families, and partly
because there is a correlation between the incomes of parents and children."l
If the debts of a poor family become overwhelming, it may make sense to
file for bankruptcy in order to discharge those debts that are dischargeable,
and then to focus on repaying the student loans that are not dischargeable.
Table 1:Percentage of Families with Various Types of Debt"
Deciles of
Mortgage
Family Income
Less than 12,250
7
12,250-18,000
9
18,000-24,700
14
24,700-31,850
22
31,850-40,000
32
40,000-49,000
41
49,000-60,850
45
60,850-76,800
53
76,800-105,300
52
More than 105,300
47

Vehicle
Loans
6
9
14
19
24
28
31
34
34
23

Credit
Cards
25
24
32
39
42
46
47
48
45
30

Student
Loans
13
9
10
10
12
10
11
12
10
5

Other
Debts
17
15
20
24
27
32
35
40
39
39

Families
with Debt
50
47
57
65
72
78
81
84
83
76

10 See e.g. Jere R. Behrman & Paul Taubmen, "The Intergenerational Correlation Between
Children's Adult Earnings and Their Parents' Income: Results from the Michigan Panel Survey of
Income Dynamics" (1990) 36 Rev. Income & Wealth 115.
" 1999 Survey of FinancialSecruti, supranote 7, unweighted. See also Saul Schwartz & S.
Baum, "How Much Debt is Too Much? Benchmarks for Manageable Debt in Canada and the United
States" (Paper presented to the Universities and the Powering of Knowledge: Policy, Regulation, and
Innovation conference, School of Public Policy and Administration, Carleton University, Ottawa, 19
October 2007) [unpublished]. Note: All debts are reported for the family as a whole.
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Table 2: Dollar Amount of Debt Outstanding for Families with Non-negative Debt

fr

2

1

Deciles of
Vehicle
Credit
Student
Other
Debt
Family Income
Mortgagc
Loans
Cards
Loans
Debts
Per Family
Less than $12,250
62,260
6,968
2,064
11,961
6,562
19,430
12,250-18,000
52,348
8,338
1,957
12,013
8,601
19,875
18,000-24,700
51,815
8,113
2,233
9,983
6,307
23,651
24,700-31,850
51,783
9,393
2,551
11,593
8,171
29,248
31,850-40,000
58,804
9,835
2,696
10,611
9,021
39,202
40,000-49,000
65,158
10,897
2,998
10,093
9,126
48,871
49,000-60,850
70,281
11,005
3,186
9,619
11,740
58,561
60,850-76,800
75,093
12,054
3,479
9,979
14,589
69,382
76,800-105,300
80.899
14,469
3,786
9,769
17,632
77,080
More than 105,300
117,558
16,108
4,721
12,354
33,2661
109,512
No. of Families
5,098
3,506
5,993
1,615
4,592
10,543

III.

OVERVIEW OF THE CANADIAN SYSTEM

One option facing poor but heavily indebted Canadians is to do
nothing. Whatever threats might be made by collectors, and regardless of
the persistence of their calls and visits, such individuals are likely to be
judgment-proof and the threats and calls will eventually stop. However, when
faced with persistent and threatening collection calls, "doing nothing" is
easier said than done. Few know the law well enough to know that the threats
are empty and that the calls will stop sooner rather than later. For those who
seek to resolve their debt situations, bankruptcy can be the best option. The
other major option-credit counselling as currently practiced in Canada-is
unlikely to be successful because poor debtors lack the financial resources to
make the payments required by a debt management plan. "Doing nothing"
also leaves the outstanding debts in place, waiting for the person should he
or she ever find a way out of poverty and thus lose judgment-proof status.
Since private-sector trustees administer bankruptcies, a poor
debtor seeking bankruptcy protection must find a trustee who is willing
to handle such a file. Not surprisingly, trustees consider whether they are
likely to be paid for their efforts before they agree to take on a case.
Trustees are paid from the money that they collect on behalf of the
creditors; this money defines the estate of the debtor. Rule 128(1) of the
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act' 3sets out the method by which trustees
calculate the maximum fees. Essentially, the maximum fees are a function
of the amount of receipts coming into the estate. At most, a trustee can

" Schwartz & Baum, ibid.
'-'R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 [BL4]. See Appendix III for the text of Rule 128(1) of the BL4.
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collect the first $975 of receipts, plus 35% of the next $1,025, plus 50% of
everything above $2,000, to a maximum of $10,000. In practice, it seems
that trustees try to realize at least $1,500 to $1,700 on each file. Of course,
they are free to take less if they so choose.
Two major sources of receipts for the estate, and thus for trustee
fees, are selling the debtor's non-exempt assets and filing the debtor's
tax refunds. In many cases, however, debtors have no non-exempt assets
and the amounts that can be expected from their tax returns are not
enough to bring the receipts of the estate up to an acceptable level. In
such cases, trustees are allowed to ask the debtors to make voluntary
payments to the estate over the course of the nine months of the
voluntary
bankruptcy. 4 In a significant minority of bankruptcies, 1 these
5
estate.
the
of
receipts
the
of
bulk
the
comprise
payments
The problem for the poor debtors is that trustees may decide,
rightly or wrongly, that the receipts of the estate, including any voluntary
payments that the debtor can afford, are not likely to reach an
acceptable level. If so, the trustee need not accept the case.
In our interviews with trustees, we realized that a poor debtor who
decides to seek bankruptcy in Canada but unable to afford the voluntary
payments required by most trustees has two options. First, the debtor may
try to find a trustee who will handle the file at a lower-than-normal price.
Second, the debtor might seek help from the BAP, operated by the OSB.
A.

Relying on Local Trustees

Conceivably, a debtor who seeks help from local trustees might
be turned away by all of them. However, none of the trustees that we
Though there is case law in Canada suggesting that such fee agreements are not allowed,
recent legislation amends the BA to reverse the case law and reinstate these agreements. See Bill C-55,
An Act to establishthe Wage EarnerProtectionProgramAct, to amendthe Bankruptcyand Insolvency
Act and the Companies' CreditorsArrangementAct and to make consequentialamendments to other
Acts, 1st Sess., 38th Parl., 2005, (assented to on 25 November 2005; not currently in force), S.C. 2005, c.47,
online: Parliament of Canada <http:/Avww2.parl.gc.ca/content/hocBills/381/GovernmentC-55/C-55_4/C55 4.PDF> [Statute c. 47]. See also BIA, ibid., s. 156.1.
14

's For the 2006 summary administration bankruptcies described in Appendix III, the
proportion of receipts consisting of voluntary payments by the debtor can be estimated. Voluntary
payments were made in 77% of the cases. Such payments made up more than 50% of the receipts in 49%
of the cases and were more than 75% of the receipts of the estate in 25% of the cases. A controversial
issue here is that the voluntary payments that trustees are allowed to ask of debtors become part of the
estate and cannot be returned to the debtor should actual receipts turn out to be unexpectedly large. If
trustees expect that receipts from the sale of non-exempt assets or from tax refunds will cover trustees'
usual fees, they will presumably lower or eliminate the voluntary payments. The only mechanism driving
trustees to lower their fees in such cases, however, is potential competition from other trustees.
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interviewed believed that large numbers of poor debtors were being
turned away due to their inability to pay trustees' fees. Even if some
area firms were unwilling to accept the files, the trustees thought that
poor debtors would be able to find at least one trustee who would be
flexible in the fees that he or she asked. The majority of the trustees we
interviewed indicated that they themselves would never turn away a
debtor seeking bankruptcy if they thought that the only obstacle to
bankruptcy was the level of their fees. Most would agree with one
trustee's statement that she "would never refuse someone who cannot
afford the fee."' 6 However, the decision to be flexible on fees is not
automatic; the trustees described the decision as one that is made on a
case-by-case basis, and is dependent upon the information gleaned
during initial interviews with the debtor.
The trustees were willing to go beyond personal experience to
suggest that such flexibility is quite common among trustees. While this
flexibility may be common, it may not be universal. One trustee said that
the national firms in her location did not lower their fees if the debtor
could not pay. 7 Another trustee (from a national firm) said that firms
that were busy were unlikely to be flexible in their fees. 8
In some cities, area trustees have gotten together and decided to
handle the cases of poor debtors according to an agreed-upon formula. Such
voluntary plans are not new. In 1969, the Globe andMailreported:"A newly
formed group of Ontario bankruptcy trustees [have] agreed to negotiate a
plan for reduced-cost services to debtors who cannot afford the usual $500
fee for personal bankrupts."' 9 The plan was aimed at "'... the honest debtor
who deserves the benefit of the bankruptcy but can't finance it himself."'2
In 1994, trustees in the Halifax region agreed that, as a group,
they would handle the bankruptcies of anyone who needed the service
6

Interview with Trustee 1,supra note 4.

"Interview with Trustee 2, 8 September 2006.
"8 Interview with Trustee 9, 29 November 2006.
9

Loren Lind, "New service offered to lower costs of bankruptcy" Globe andMail(6February
1969) 4th: 35. It is important to note that in that era the summary tariff was a flat $450 fee plus $50 for
disbursements. This was the maximum fee possible for such files regardless of the amount of work
performed. At that time, the vast majority of trustees required that the $500 had to be paid up front
before the bankruptcy would be filed. Given an average annual inflation rate of 4.68, the equivalent of the
$500 fee in 2007 would be $2,840. Inflation based on Bank of Canada's Inflation Calculator,online:
<http://www.bankofcanada.calen/rates/inflationcalc.html> [Bank of Canada, Inflation Calculato].
20 Lind, ibid., quoting Keral Jerabek, then-president of the Ontario Association of
Trustees in Bankruptcy.
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and could not afford it.2 That agreement has persisted over time, and
today poor debtors are asked to pay only $250.22 Similarly, trustees in
Edmonton agreed in 1999 to a similar arrangement for dealing with
what are now known as "450 cases" because the out-of-pocket costs (and
therefore the fee charged) at the time amounted to $450.23
Apart from the reports of trustees, however, there is no way to
determine precisely how many debtors are simply turned away, who do
not approach trustees because they think they will be unable to afford
the normal fees, or who cannot afford upfront payments of $250-$450.24
B.

The BankruptcyAssistanceProgram

The OSB administers the little-used BAP. 25 Trustees first agree to
be part of the program, and those who do so are placed on a list of
available trustees. The program then assigns listed trustees to administer
the files of debtors who have approached at least two trustees to handle
their bankruptcies and who have been turned away because of their
inability to pay the normal fees.
Very few cases are actually filed under the BAP. Of the roughly
thirty thousand summary administration cases described in Appendix III,
only 304 (about 1%) were BAP cases.26 Our interviews illustrate, however,
that it would be a mistake to assume that the number of BAP cases is equal
to the number of poor debtors. For example, in the cities where an
agreement exists among trustees to handle poor debtors in a certain way,
trustees will often not refer poor debtors to the BAP program, but will
simply administer the cases themselves. Perhaps a better measure of the
number of poor debtors is the number of cases in which receipts are less
than $500; of the non-BAP summary administration bankruptcies in our
data set, receipts were less than $500 in 1,056, or about 3.5%, of the files.
21

Interview with Trustee 6, 20 September 2006.

2The fee is still $250 in Halifax even though out-of-pocket costs are now higher. Ibid.
2 Interview with Trustee 3, 8 September 2006. Given an average annual inflation rate of 2.35,
the equivalent of the $450 fee in 2007 would be $542. Bank of Canada, Inflation Calculator,supranote 19.
24 We note that this is a common situation in evaluating program participation; since
information on non-participants is rarely collected, there is no effective way to estimate their number
apart from anecdotal evidence from practitioners.
' The statutory source for the BAP is a directive known as "Directive No. 11" made pursuant
to the BMA,supra note 13. Section 5(4)(b) to (e) of the BA provides the OSB with the power to make
directives. Canada, OSB, Directive No. 11, "Bankruptcy Assistance Program," (23 October 1986), online:
Strategis <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epiclsite/bsf-osb.nsf/en/br0133le.html> ["Directive No. 11"].
26
Calculations by the Business Intelligence Centie of the OSB.
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There is no set fee charged by trustees for BAP cases. As in all
summary administration cases, the trustee collects GST refunds and any
tax refund arising from the pre-bankruptcy tax return. For poor debtors,
these sources might yield only a small amount of money. In such cases,
most of the trustees that we interviewed ask that the debtor pay for the
$75 filing fee and the $180 cost of the two mandatory counselling
sessions up front, allowing the debtor to make any remaining voluntary
payments that may be required by the trustee with small payments over
the nine months of the bankruptcy.
One trustee told us, however, that BAP cases in her area were
often almost as remunerative as non-BAP cases, with the trustee
realizing fees close to the usual amount charged.2 7 The Edmonton
trustee that we interviewed stated that the GST refunds usually cover the
out-of-pocket costs and that she had only lost money on two of the "450
cases" that she has handled since 1999.28 Another trustee informed us
that he averages $1,000 to $1,200 on a BAP case, as opposed to the
29
$1,200 to'$1,500 that he charges for a typical summary administration.
Looking at the receipts and disbursements for the 304 BAP cases
in our data set, we see that the average trustee fee in these cases was
$1,500, with a standard deviation of $986. This average seemed
surprisingly high and we thought it might be influenced by a handful of
cases in which the receipts of the estate (and thus the trustee's fee) were
inflated by unusual circumstances. For example, one BAP debtor
received a $39,000 inheritance during his bankruptcy. However, the
median trustee fee is $1,594, suggesting that the few cases with large
receipts were not the main factor underlying the high mean. Voluntary
payments from the debtors were not common; such payments were
made in only 61 of the 304 cases.
Even though the average fees on.BAP cases seem high to us, one
trustee felt that there was no unmet need for bankruptcy in his area. He
thought that all those who sought help in his area were being served
and, furthermore, extensive advertising by trustees meant that no needy
debtors were unaware of the option of filing. 30 Another trustee observed
that, because the ability of trustees to oppose the bankrupt's discharge
27
28
2

Interview with Trustee 3, supra note 23.
ibid.
Interview with Trustee 5, supra note 3.

30 Ibid.
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for unpaid fees provided security that their fees would be paid, few
debtors were turned way. The same trustee, however, also observed that
the costs of attending at court for the discharge hearing might be
excessive for a trustee operating on his or her own.3
C.

Discussion

We believe that the lack of uniform treatment of poor debtors is
a major impediment to equal access to bankruptcy. In effect, their
bankruptcies are handled in a way similar to how paupers received aid
before the advent of modern social assistance systems, when local
charities, local churches, or municipal governments took up the task of
providing for the destitute. As a result, the nature of the assistance that
the poor received varied widely across Canada. Some received the
assistance that they required, while others did not. Similarly, some poor
debtors have low-cost access to bankruptcy, while others do not.
A broad assessment of the situation suggests that most of those who
seek bankruptcy are able to file. The cost of filing varies across the country,
however, so the extent to which low-cost access is available is unknown.
Debtors who cannot afford to pay trustee fees can use the BAP
program, but few do. Instead, some individual trustees and groups of
trustees take it upon themselves to provide service to poor debtors. The
Halifax and Edmonton agreements discussed in Part III(A), above, are
examples of collective action of the sort that local charities might have
undertaken to help the poor in the nineteenth century.
While the analogy to nineteenth-century social assistance is apt in
some ways, it is less appropriate in others. For trustees specializing in
consumer bankruptcies, fee flexibility is sometimes a good business decision
rather than pro bono work. Most small businesses need to maintain a
steady volume of cases in order to keep the staff busy. During periods when
full-price cases are scarce, servicing poor debtors "keeps the lights on" even
if the profit on such cases may turn out to be low or non-existent.3" The idea
is that "anything is a contribution to overhead., 33 The marginal cost of such
cases is very small since the staff is already on site and may be
underemployed during slow periods. Thus, the files of poor debtors may
31

Interview with Trustee 9, supranote 18.

32
33

Interview with Trustee 3, supranote 23.
Interview with Trustee 5, supranote 3.
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have a positive effect on the economic viability of trustees' businesses,
helping them cover overhead during slow periods. Two of the interviewed
trustees even thought that removing the files of poor debtors might
endanger the economic viability of trustees who specialize in consumer
bankruptcy.34 The trustee from the large firm also noted this phenomenon
when he said that he did not have to.worry about cash flow and therefore
did not need to take on the files of poor debtors for that reason.
IV.

SHOULD POOR DEBTORS HAVE FINANCIALLY
ACCESSIBLE OPTIONS FOR BANKRUPTCY?

A.

The American In Forma Pauperis Experience

The American academic literature has tackled the issue of
whether poor debtors should be allowed to file in forma pauperispetitions
in bankruptcy. In the United States, the authority to proceed in forma
pauperisis granted by statute, and is meant to provide indigent litigants
with meaningful access to the federal courts, equivalent to the access
available to those who can afford to pay.35 When an individual successfully
petitions to proceed informapauperis,certain costs and fees are waived.36
Those who argue against allowing in forma pauperis proceedings in
bankruptcy stress the cost implications of waiving fees: that the amount of
fees collected by the system will decrease.37 Furthermore, critics assert,
nearly everyone who files for bankruptcy relief will ask that fees be waived,
requiring screening mechanisms to be introduced. Opponents further
suggest that a fee-waiver system will encourage unnecessary and improper
bankruptcy cases.39 Individuals will file for bankruptcy even when there is
no benefit in doing so, because debtors who cannot afford the filing fee
are typically judgment-proof.4" Such a.system may also be subject to abuse

34

Interview with Trustee 3, supra note 23; Interview with Trustee 6, supranote 21.
Michael C. Markham & Bethann Scharrer, "In Forma Pauperis: An Unnecessary Privilege
in Bankruptcy" (1994) 2 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 73 at 77.
36 bid at 78. In the United States, some costs and fees are not waived. For example, witness
fees and expenses are not among the fees and costs waived.
37
bid at 90.
38

39

]bid.

Ibid.
. US Federal Judicial Centre, "Implementing and Evaluating the Chapter 7 Filing Fee
Waiver Program: Report to the Committee on the Administration of the Bankruptcy System of the
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or fraud; critics argue, for example, that a fee-waiver system will increase
the number of people who file to benefit from an automatic stay, with no
intention of following through to a discharge.4'
In the American context, some commentators assert that a feewaiver system is unnecessary because the filing fees can be paid in
instalments, and as such, access to the system is denied only in rare
circumstances. 42 Otis B. Grant argues that the filing fee must be retained
because of the easy availability of discharge: if a debtor believes that
discharge is costless, Grant asserts, he or she will be more likely to use
it. 43 Bankruptcy must have a cost, he states, because otherwise creditors

will shift the cost of bankruptcy to the buyers of goods.' Lastly, Michael
Markham and Bethann Scharrer argue that proceeding in a bankruptcy
case is "nothing more than a privilege," and thus "it seems logical 45that
proceeding in forma pauperis in bankruptcy is also only a privilege.,
In the Canadian context, the suggestion coming out of the
American commentary that a low or non-existent filing fee coupled with
an easy discharge would have a significant impact on the bankruptcy
rate can be challenged. The two existing empirical studies that bear on
the abuse assumption in Canada suggest that the majority of existing
Canadian bankrupts fall into the "can't pay" rather than the "won't pay"
category.46 While it is possible that the costs associated with bankruptcy
played a role in these findings, it is unlikely that the composition of
bankrupts would be significantly altered if "poor debtors" were given
access to the system. This prediction is supported by our findings from
the interviews with trustees, who suggested that as long as they continue
to be the intermediaries in this process they would continue to play a

Judicial Conference of the United States" by Elizabeth C. Wiggins et al., (Federal Judicial Center, 1998)
at 21, online: <http:/Awvw.fjc.gov/hbrary/fccatalog.nsf/autoframepage!openform&uri=/hbraryfjccatalog.
nsf/Publication!openform& parentunid=76FF032DF9BA521B85256CA300688AE3>.
41-bid at 22.
42

ibid.

43

Otis B. Grant "Are the Indigent Too Poor for Bankruptcy? A Critical Legal Interpretation of the
Theory of Fresh Start within a Law and Economics Paradigm" (2002) 33 Univ. Toledo L Rev. 773 at 792.
44 Ibid at 793.
4

Markham & Scharrer, supranote 35 at 83.

4 See Saul Schwartz, "The Empirical Dimensions of Consumer Bankruptcy: Results from a
Survey of Canadian Bankrupts" (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 83; lain D.C. Ramsay, "Individual
Bankruptcy: Preliminary Findings of a Socio-Legal Analysis Symposium on Consumer Bankruptcies"
(1999) 37 Osgoode Hall 1.. 15.
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"gate-keeping" function. That is, trustees will restrict access to "won't
pay" debtors. In addition, unlike the American system, the Canadian
system continues to include a judicial discharge process that allows for
47
the possibility of opposing the discharge of an "abusive" bankruptcy.
Henry J. Sommer succinctly states the argument in favour of being
able to proceed in forma pauperis in bankruptcy filings: "Equal justice
under the law."48 His response to the argument that the filing fee is low
enough, and can be paid in instalments, is that "... those who make [the
argument] must be shockingly unfamiliar with the plight of those in poverty
in this country."49 Sommer notes that people file for bankruptcy for other
reasons than to protect assets, for instance, to prevent a utility shutoff, to
protect a driver's licence, to participate in a government program, to prevent
garnishment of wages (which is allowed in some states), or to fend off
harassing or abusive calls from creditors or collection agencies.5" Sommer's
statements reflect the findings on the need for bankruptcy for the poor
from our interviews of Canadian bankruptcy trustees. Like Sommers, who
considers the fears of overburdening the system with more paperwork to be
overstated,1 we agree that the solution to abuse is not to restrict access to
the system but to address the problem directly: the possibility that some
might abuse the system is not a reason to reject a proposed reform.
V.

MODELS FOR REFORM

A number of jurisdictions have acted on concerns such as those
expressed by Sommer and the trustees we interviewed, and, recognizing
that it can be difficult for poor debtors to file for bankruptcy due to the
associated costs, we have identified forms of relief that can assist poor
debtors in obtaining a fresh start. The following section documents the
4

'See BIA, supra note 13, s. 168.1(1).

48 Henry J. Sommer, "In Forma Pauperis in Bankruptcy: The Time has Long since Come"

(1994) 2 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 93 at 97.
49

Ibid.at 100.
11 Ibid. at 103-04. See also Susan D. Kovac, "Judgment-Proof Debtors in Bankruptcy" (1991)
65 Am. Bankr. U. 675 at 678-81 for a discussion of the benefits and costs of bankruptcy for judgmentproof debtors; and Nathaniel C. Nichols, "The Poor Need Not Apply: Moralistic Barriers to Bankruptcy's
Fresh Start (1993-1994) 25 Rutgers U. 329 at 351-53, where he points out that filing for bankruptcy is an
effective way for a poor family to prevent the stoppage of a utility service, while providing for a fresh
beginning with the utility service.
s'Sommer, supra note 48 at 105.
-

2

Ibid at 107.
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available and proposed bankruptcy services for the poor in the United
States, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.
United States

A.

Title 28 of the United States Code (U.S.C.) represents the
American in forma pauperis statute, which allows an individual to file
civil actions in federal courts without paying the requisite filing fee.53 A
person seeking to proceed in forma pauperis must file an affidavit
showing an inability to pay the associated costs.54 Section 1930 governs
the payment of fees in bankruptcy courts. As the statute was previously
worded, bankruptcy courts did not fall under the definition of a "court
of the United States," and therefore had no authority to allow in forma
pauperisproceedings.55 A 1973 decision of the US Supreme Court held
that there was no constitutional right to obtain a discharge of one's debts
in bankruptcy, and concluded that the fee provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code at the time were not an unconstitutional denial of due process
rights.56 Thus, the legislation and jurisprudence previously precluded the
application of Title 28 to the initial filing fee for a bankruptcy petition.
Under section 418 of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
ConsumerProtectionAct of200 (and codified at Title 28 of the U.S.C.),
however, individual Chapter 758 applicants may now seek a waiver of the
filing fee at the time they file the bankruptcy petition.59 Under the new
legislation, a district or bankruptcy court may waive the filing fee for an
individual debtor who (a) has income less than 150% of the poverty

sJ Markham & Scharrer, supra note 35 at 73. Note that the current fee for a Chapter 7
filing is US$299, effective as of 9 April 2006: United States, Administrative Office of the US Courts,
"Bankruptcy Filing Fees" in US Bankruptcy Courts, online: US Courts <http://www.uscourts.gov/
bankruptcycourts/fees.html>. Given an exchange rate of 1.0654 (for 1 July 2007) the equivalent of
the US$299 fee in Canadian dollars would be $319. The exchange rate is based on Bank of
Canada's Daily noon rates: 10-year lookup, online: <http://www.bank-banque-canada.ca/en/rates/
exchange-look.html > [Bank of Canada, Daily noon rates].
5

'

Markham & Scharrer, ibid.at 77.

' See ibid. at 80 for an overview of the decisions which have held that bankruptcy courts are
not courts of the United States.
6
]bid.at 74-75. See also UnitedStates v. Kras; 409 U.S. 434 (1973) [Kras].
'Sommer, supranote 48 at 95.
8 So-called because Chapter 7 of Title 11 ("Bankruptcy") of the U.S.C. governs liquidations,
the most common form of US bankruptcy.
s' Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer ProtectionAct of 2005, 119 Stat. 27, s. 418,
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1930(0(1-3).
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guidelines last established by the US Department of Health and Human
Services;6 and (b) is unable to pay that fee in instalments.6 For individual
debtors whose filing fees have been waived, the bankruptcy or district
court may also waive other fees. 6 2 In addition, the U.S.C. allows for the
payment of the filing fee in instalments.6 3
Congress implemented a pilot program in 1994 in six judicial
districts to study the effect of waiving the US$17564 filing fee for individual
Chapter 7 debtors who were unable to pay the fee in instalments.65 The
study found that an application for waiver of the filing fee was filed in
3.4% of all non-business Chapter 7 cases, and granted in 2.9% of the
cases. 66 The report concluded that the fee-waiver program might make
the bankruptcy system more accessible to low-income debtors: almost
11% of the successful fee-waiver applicants stated that they would not
have filed for bankruptcy had there been no fee-waiver program.67 In
particular, the "committee concluded that the fee-waiver program may
have enhanced access to the bankruptcy system for indigent single
women."68 Debtors whose filing fees were waived "were more likely to
obtain a discharge compared to debtors whose applications were

o See United States, Department of Health and Human Services, "THE 2007 HHS
POVERTY GUIDELINES" (24 January 2007), online: <http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/07poverty.shtml>.
61 United States, Judicial Conference, "Interim Procedures Regarding the Chapter 7 Fee
Waiver Provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005" (11
August 2005), in US Bankruptcy Courts online: US Courts <http://www.uscourts.gov/
bankruptcycourts/jcusguidelines.html>.
6228 U.S.C. § 1930()(2). The fees that may be waived are those prescribed under §§ 1930(b) and (c).
6 Fed. Bankr. Rule 1006; ibid, § 1930(a). Upon petition,
the court may ...
grant leave to pay in installments and fix the number, amount and dates of payment.
The number of installments shall not exceed four, and the final installment shall be payable not later
than 120 days after filing the petition. For cause shown, the court may extend the time of any
installment, provided the last installment is paid not later than 180 days after filing the petition.

See Fed. Bankr. Rule 1006(b)(2).
' Given an exchange rate of 1.3825 (as of 1 July 2007) and an average annual inflation rate of
2.10, the equivalent of the 1994 US$175 fee in 2007 Canadian dollars would be $317. Exchange rate:
Werner Antweiler, "Database Retrieval System (v.2.12)," Pacific Exchange Rate Service, University of
British Columbia,. online: <http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/data.html>; inflation: Bank of Canada, Inflation
Calculator, supra note 19.
1 See Wiggins et al., supra note 40.
66Ibid.at 1.
67Ibid at 4.
6

SIbid.
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denied."69 The report noted that there was an increase overall in
Chapter 7 and Chapter 1370 filings during the period of study, thereby
complicating the assessment of whether the program increased Chapter
7 filings. The study concluded, however, that only a "small fraction" of
the increased filings were due to the program.7' Assuming that
applications would be filed and granted at the same rate as occurred in
the pilot program, the study predicted that a national fee-waiver
program would cost approximately US$4.7 million in lost filing fees,
US$74,000 in waived miscellaneous fees for in forma pauperis debtors,
and US$1.5 million in salary for additional office clerk personnel (a total
cost of approximately US$6.3 million). 72 To fund the program, the study
recommended that Congress increase the judiciary's appropriation by
this amount, 73 or request authorization for a portion of the US Treasury
share of the filing fee to cover the cost. 74
In addition to filing fees, American debtors often are confronted
with legal fees as they navigate the complex bankruptcy process. As
Kerry Haydel Ducey notes, it is unlikely that a no-asset Chapter 7 filer
can afford to pay a bankruptcy attorney up front.75 Without a retainer, a
bankruptcy attorney is unlikely to pay the requisite filing fees or perform
other pre-petition services because the debtor's obligation to pay for
76
these services are likely to be discharged in the bankruptcy proceeding.
Most courts have held that pre-petition attorney fees are dischargeable,
forcing bankruptcy attorneys to "get creative" if they wish to be paid.77
In addition, a debtor's attorney cannot be paid out of funds of the estate
in a Chapter 7 proceeding, which has heightened access to justice issues
69

Ibid.

7 So-called because Chapter 13 of Title 11 ("Bankruptcy") of the U.S.C. governs
reorganization.
7' Ibid.at 6.
'z Ibid. at 12. The study did indicate that the cost might rise significantly if fee waivers were
automatically based on a bright-line income standard.
73This represented two tenths of one per cent of the judiciary's total fiscal appropriation for
1997. Ibid at 13.

' Ibid Given an exchange rate of 1.3825 and an average annual inflation rate of 2.10, the
equivalent of the 1994 US$6.3 million cost fee in 2007 Canadian dollars would be $11,412,424. Exchange
rate: Antweiler, supranote 64; inflation: Bank of Canada, Inflation Calculator,supranote 19.

' Kerry Heydel Ducey, "Bankruptcy, Just for the Rich? An Analysis of Popular Fee
Arrangements for Pre-petition Legal Fees and a Call to Amend" (2001) 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1665 at 1667.
7
6bbid
77

lbid at 1671.
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because the debtor's attorney must be paid in cash up front, or else the
attorney cannot participate in the estate. 78 Accordingly, Haydel Ducey
recommends exempting pre-petition bankruptcy attorney fees from
discharge, which would in turn encourage counsel to represent "even
the poorest of debtors" by removing the risks of representing those who
may be unable to pay their legal fees in advance.79 Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(1), the court may request an attorney to represent someone
who is unable to afford counsel, although most bankruptcy judges have
decided that they do not have the authority to do so. s"
Given that both the American consumer credit market and
bankruptcy system have much in common with the Canadian market
and bankruptcy system, the American model for dealing with "poor
debtors" merits serious consideration. In particular, the experience of
the American pilot project undertaken in the mid-1990s suggests that
the number of bankruptcy filings will not increase significantly with the
availability of a fee-waiver system, thus laying to rest some of the fears
associated with abuse of the system as well as the costs of implementing
such a system.
B.

Australia

The vast majority of bankruptcies in Australia are administered
by official receivers, who work as representatives of the Official Trustee
of the Insolvency and Trustee Service'Australia (ITSA). Trustees from
the private sector do, however, administer some bankruptcies.8'
Australia's bankruptcy regime provides three alternative bankruptcy

78 Lamie v. US Trustee, 540 U.S. 526 (2004). 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) does not list a debtor's
attorney as someone eligible for compensation from the bankruptcy estate. We thank John Pottow for
drawing this case to our attention. Note also that much controversy has erupted over the new 11 U.S.C.
§ 524(a)(4)'s prohibition on advising clients to incur more debt before bankruptcy, which implies that
attorneys cannot advise their clients to file for bankruptcy if to do so would require the debtor to borrow
money to pay for filing or counsel fees. Pottow indicates that most courts that have considered this
provision have struck it down as unconstitutional.
79

Heydel Ducey, supra note 75 at 1672.
Richard H.W. Maloy, "Should Bankruptcy Be Reserved for People Who Have Money? Or
is the Bankruptcy Court a Court of the United States?" (1997) 7 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 3 at 28. The courts
have generally. found that, due to the Kras decision (supra note 56), the section is inapplicable to
bankruptcy proceedings.
1t Rosalind Mason, "Consumer Bankruptcies: An Australian Perspective" (1999) 37 Osgoode
80

Hall L.J. 449 at 453. The Official Trustee in Australia is a person who administers statutory functions
under the BankruptcyAct 1966for the Australian government.
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options, one of which is accessible to low-income debtors. First, under
section 55 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966,82 a debtor may apply for
bankruptcy without the need for court involvement. A debtor may
become bankrupt by presenting a petition and statement of financial
affairs to an official receiver. If the documents are in correct form and
there is no creditor's petition pending, the official receiver must accept
the petition. The individual becomes bankrupt on the day the petition is
accepted, and the official receiver automatically becomes the trustee
unless the individual nominates a privately registered trustee. In most
cases, the bankrupt will be automatically discharged after three years.83
The vast majority of bankruptcy cases in Australia proceed through the
Official Trustee's office, and in cases where the bankrupt does not have
money in his or her estate, there is no payment made to the Official
Trustee.84 Thus, for the poor, bankruptcy is effectively subsidized by the
public, because no funding comes from their estates.
Second, bankruptcy is available under Part X of the Bankruptcy
Act-a more expensive, more sophisticated process involving lawyers.
Third, debt agreements under Part IX of the Bankruptcy Act are
available to represent a low-cost alternative to bankruptcy for those who
can afford to make some payments; however, they are not likely to be
viable for poor debtors.8 5
Under the Australian government's cost-recovery policy, the
ITSA has adopted a formal cost-recovery regime in respect of fees and
charges payable under the BankruptcyAct 1966 and related legislation.
In 2004, the ITSA undertook a review of its fees and charges, identifying
which services should be cost recovered, the type of charge to apply,
who should pay, and which services would be more appropriately
2(Cth) as amended, s.55 [BankruptcyAct 1966].
SSee BankruptcyAct 1966 ibid., ss. 149-149Q. The bankrupt will be automatically discharged
after three years, unless (i) an early discharge from bankruptcy has been granted by the trustee (only
applies to bankruptcies in existence prior to 5 May 2003, since the amendments of BankruptcyLegislation
Amendment Act 2002 (Cth.)), (ii) an objection to discharge has been filed by the trustee, or (iii) the
bankruptcy has been annulled. See ITSA, "Bankruptcy-Long Version," online: <http:/Avww.itsa.gov.au/
dir228/itsaweb.nsf/docindex/bankruptcy-%3Ebankruptcy+-+long+version>.
s4 Tony Duggan, "Consumer Bankruptcy in Canada and Australia: A Comparative Overview"
in Janis Sarra, ed., AnnualReview ofInsolvency Law2006(Carswell:Toronto, 2007) 857.
85 See ITSA, "Part IX Debt Agreements," online: <http://www.itsa.gov.au/dir228/
itsaweb.nsf/docindex/debt+agreements-%3Epart+ix+debt+agreements>. See also ITSA & Attorney
General, "Report on the Review of Debt Agreements Under Part IX of the Bankruptcy Act 1966,"
online: <http://www.itsa.gov.au/dir228/itsaweb.nsf/docindex/Refonrm-%3EAmendments%20documents/
$FILE/debt-agreement reviewreport.pdf> [Review of Debt Agreements].
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covered through general taxation.86 The new fees and charges are
effeotive from 1 July 2006. There is no fee for processing section 55
87
debtor petitions or debt agreement proposals.
The ITSA's "Cost Recovery Impact Statement" indicated that an
AUS$250 fee would have to be charged to recover the processing costs
of debtors' section 55 petitions.8 8 The ITSA deemed, however, that this
fee would not be consistent with broader bankruptcy objectives in
89
providing a broad community benefit and not just relief for debtors.
During the consultation process, proponents of the fee argued that
debtors receive a direct benefit, and given that debtors would not have
the same debt servicing burdens once their petition is accepted, they
should be able to afford the fee. 9° Critics argued that it would be
counter-intuitive to subject debtors facing financial hardship to the fee,
9
and that its imposition would deny many debtors access to the system.
Creditors noted that ultimately they would end up paying the fee in
many cases, as debtors would choose not to pay certain bills, or would
acquire additional credit to pay the processing fee.92
While the Australian debate on the issue of filing fees for
bankruptcy appears to have been settled in a similar fashion as the most
recent American debates, there remains a key difference. The Australian
discharge provisions under section 55 are more onerous than those in
either the United States or Canada. For example, a three-year period is
required before discharge under the Australian model, in comparison to
the typical nine-month period in Canada. Presumably, the result is that
higher-income debtors will opt for one of the two alternative bankruptcy
options, meaning that a different and less attractive form of fresh start is
86Bankruptcy Legislation (Feesand Charges)Bill 20O Bills Digest no. 110 2005-06, online:
Parliament of Australia <http://www.aph.gov.au/LIBRARY/pubs/BD/2005-06/06bd1lO.htm>.
87 See ITSA, "ITSA Fees and Charges" (effective 1 July 2007), online:
<http:/Avww.itsa.gov.au/dir228/itsaweb.nsf/docindex/Bankruptcy-%3EPamphlets%20and%2Fact%20
Sheet%20Documents/$FILE/Fees and charges.pdf>.
88 ITSA, "Cost Recovery Impact Statement," (February 2005), online: <http:/Avww.itsa.gov.au/
dir228/itsaweb.nsf/docinde/About%2OUs-%3ECost%20Recovery-%3ECost%20Recovery%2oDocuments/
$FILE/ CRIS_230205.pdf> [ITSA, "Cost Recovery"] at 3. Given an exchange rate of 0.9029 (for 1 July
2007), the equivalent of the AUS$250 fee in Canadian dollars would be $226. Exchange rate: Bank of
Canada, Dailynoon rates supra note 53.
8
1ITSA,"Cost Recovery," ibid.
90Ibid.at 17-18.

91Ibid.at 18.
92

Ibid.
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offered to poor debtors. This aspect of the Australian model runs counter
to the goal of equality under the law as it applies to the bankruptcy
system. As such, it replicates characteristics of the existing Canadian
system, which we find troubling.
C.

New Zealand

The New Zealand government has recently introduced the
Insolvency Act 2006,which includes a "no income no asset procedure" as
an alternative to bankruptcy as it exists in New Zealand.93 The reforms
expand the role of the Official Assignee, as all debtors will have to consult
with an Official Assignee before invoking any of the proceedings; this will
make bankruptcy an administrative procedure.9 4 Under the new regime, a
debtor will be required to file a financial statement of affairs with the Official
Assignee before pursuing bankruptcy or the no asset procedure option.95
The Official Assignee will not only provide advice and information,
Thomas Telfer notes, but also render substantive decisions on the options
pursued.96 Telfer cautiously suggests that the retention of the Official
Assignees' monopoly over bankruptcy administration may avoid some of
the problems associated with a private trustee system, such as Canada's,
where private trustees face potential conflicts of interest. However, Telfer
draws attention to the multiple roles the Official Assignee will have to
play under the proposed reforms and the potential for conflicts.97
The New Zealand Ministry of Economic Development describes
the no-asset procedure as providing "... an alternative to bankruptcy for

insolvent debtors with nominal debts, no assets and no means to repay the
debt."9 Part 5, subpart 4 of the bill sets out the rules relating to the no93

InsolvencyAct 2W6 (NZ), 2006/55 [InsolvencyAct 2006].
4 David Brown & Thomas G.W. Telfer, Personal and Corporate Insolvency Legislation

(Wellington: LexisNexis, 2007) at 7; Thomas G.W. Telfer, "New Zealand Bankruptcy Law Reform: The
New Role of the Official Assignee and the Prospects for a No-Asset Regime" in ConsumerBankruptcyin
GlobalPerspective,Johanna Niemi-Kiesilainen, lain Ramsay & William C. Whitford, eds. (Oxford and
Portland: Hart Publishing, 2003) 247 at 248 [Telfer, "New Zealand Bankruptcy Law Reform"]. The
Official Assignee is a statutory position created by the InsolvencyAct 1967(NZ) 1967/54, ss. 15-18. When
an Official Assignee is appointed to act in respect of a bankruptcy, he or she acts as an officer of the court.
9
Telfer, "New Zealand Bankruptcy Law Reform," ibid. at 257; Explanatory Note, General
Policy Statement, Bill 14-1, Insolvency Law Reform Bill (NZ), 48th Parl., 2005, online: New Zealand
Parliament <http://www.parliament.nziNR/rdonlyres/4COA36B5-EDED-41EC-BBD1-255243CCD29D/
47166/DBHOHBILL 71631229992.pdf> [Explanatory Note to Bill 14-11.

' Telfer, ibid
97

Jbid.at 258-59.
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asset procedure. The starting point is the same for proceeding in
bankruptcy: furnishing a statement of the debtor's affairs. Based on the
statement of affairs, the Assignee will decide whether the debtor qualifies
for entry to the no-asset procedure.99 The bill outlines criteria for entry to
the no-asset procedure: no assets, total debts between NZ$1,000 and
NZ$40,000,0 0 no means to repay any amount, and a clean financial record
(namely, not previously bankrupt, not previously admitted to the no-asset
procedure).'0 ' Once admitted to the no-asset procedure, the debtor enjoys
a moratorium-with some exceptions, their debts cannot be enforced
while the debtor is in the no-asset procedure. After twelve months, the
debtor is discharged and the debts are cancelled." 2 However, if the noasset procedure terminates at any time before the twelve-month period
03
has elapsed, the debtor's debts will become enforceable.1
The Assignee will have a limited role in the process because the
debtor by definition has no assets; the Assignee must ensure that an
applicant is qualified for entry, provide creditors with an opportunity to
object to a debtor being admitted to the no-asset procedure, ensure that a
debtor who has been admitted improperly is removed, and terminate the noasset procedure at the request of the debtor if the Assignee is satisfied that
the debtor, through changed circumstances, can make payment towards his
or her debts.0 4 The benefit of the no-asset procedure is that an individual's
debts are cancelled on discharge. Telfer notes that the Official Assignee will
have to play a gate-keeping function through the control of access to the
regime.'0 5 He argues that if the no-asset procedure adopted by Parliament
incorporates a number of subjective standards (such as entry criteria to
determine who may access the procedure), the benefits of a streamlined

's New Zealand, Ministry of Economic Development, Statement of Feasible Options to
Achieve the Desired Objectives," Bankruptcy Administration: No Asset Procedure and Insolvency Act
Changes-RegulatoryImpact Statement (1 December 2003), online: Ministry of Economic Development
(New Zealand) <http://www.med.govt.nzftemplates/MultipageDocumentPage6252.aspx>.
'Explanatory Note to Bill 14-1, supra note 95, cited in Brown & Telfer, supranote 94 at 28.
"oGiven an exchange rate of 0.8219 (for 1 July 2007) the equivalent of the NZ$1,00040,000 range in Canadian dollars would be $822-32,876. Exchange rate: Bank of Canada, Daily
noon rates,supra note 53.
oJ See Explanatory Note to Bill 14-1, supra note 95; InsolvencyAct2006, supranote 93, s. 363.
0

12

InsolvencyAct2006, ibid., s. 377.

t Ibid,s. 375. For example, if the debtor no longer meets the qualification requirements.
i4Ibid, ss. 363-65, 370, 372-76. See also Explanatory Note to Bill 14-1, supra note 95.
"os
Telfer, "New Zealand Bankruptcy Law Reform," supranote 94 at 265; Brown & Telfer,
supranote 94 at 30.
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no-fault bankruptcy procedure will be lost; the final legislation includes
both fixed rules and general standards, but Telfer and David Brown note
that it is not yet clear how well the criteria adopted will work in practice." 6
Under the system previously in place in New Zealand, a debtor
could apply to a District Court for a summary instalment order if his or her
debts amounted to less than NZ$12,000,1 7 and the District Court judge
could make an order that was binding on creditors. An instalment order
provided that a debtor could pay back his or her debts without the threat of
legal action while the order was in force; the process was administered by a
third party supervisor and imposed no costs on the debtor.'0 8 If a debtor
decided to petition for bankruptcy, there was a NZ$400 9 filing fee in the
High Court, although a debtor could apply to have the fee waived if he or
she could not afford the cost."' However, if a debtor wished to apply for an
early discharge (prior to the end of the three-year period), she had to retain
counsel and appear in the High Court at considerable expense.
The NINA model in New Zealand appears to address the
disadvantages of a bankruptcy system, like the Australian one, where
poor debtors can obtain access without cost but must accept more
onerous discharge provisions than higher income debtors can obtain
with the help of counsel. In Canada, once poor debtors obtain access to
the system, there is no distinction between them and higher-income
debtors in terms of how they are treated. For that reason, we do not
believe that it is necessary to create a separate NINA system in order to
address our concerns about the treatment of poor debtors.
D.

UnitedKngdom

The United Kingdom.. has also embarked on insolvency law
reform, and is working to implement a NINA procedure similar to that in
" Telfer, ibid at 268.
"7 Given an exchange rate of 0.6802 (as of 1 July 2006, since the legislation came into force in
2006) the equivalent of the NZ$12,000 maximum debt in Canadian dollars would be $8,163. Exchange
rate: Bank of Canada, Dailynoon rates supra note 53.
o New Zealand, Insolvency and Trustee Service, PersonalBankruptcy Toolkit Information
To Help Advisors Assist People Facing Bankruptcy Or People In Bankruptcy,online: <www.insolvency.
govt.nz/its-docs/I/its-bankruptcy-manual-28June.pdf> [Personal Bankruptcy Toolkit] at 6.
l" Given an exchange rate of 0.6802 (as of 1 July 2006, since the legislation came into force in
2006), the equivalent of the NZ$40 fee in Canadian dollars would be $27. Exchange rate: Bank of
Canada, Dailynoon rates supranote 53.
11oPersonalBankruptcy Toollk4 supranote 108 at 7.
..
' For the purposes of this article, the United Kingdom refers to England and Wales, as
Scotland and Northern Ireland operate under different insolvency regimes.

Bankruptcyfor the Poor?

2007]

New Zealand."' In 2004, the Department for Constitutional Affairs (DCA)
published a consultation paper entitled "A Choice of Paths: better options
to manage over-indebtedness and multiple debt.""' 3 With regard to "can't
pay" debtors,' 1 4 the paper proposed two options: the introduction of a
court-based debt relief order and a NINA procedure." 5 Under the former
option, a debtor would be released from his or her debts after twelve
months, unless a creditor could provide evidence of non-declared assets.
The recommendations for this option included a debt limit and an
unspecified fee for debtors to enter the scheme." 6 Since the publication of
this report, the British Insolvency Service has focused on the latter NINA
option, and developed what it deems "... a non-court based scheme of debt

relief that would alleviate debt in certain cases where there is currently no
realistic alternative, but which is simple and likely to be relatively cheap to
administer. '""' The scheme is aimed at those people who cannot pay "even
a portion of their debt within a reasonable timeframe"" 8-people with no
assets, very little income, and a relatively low level of liabilities, and who
cannot access any of the debt solutions available (such as bankruptcy)." 9
In March 2005, the Insolvency Service published a paper for
discussion, which focussed solely on the NINA procedure, and recognized
that "[tlhere is a category of person who has fallen into debt and has no
way out of it."' 0 British research has shown that "the great majority of
people who fall into arrears with their household bills or credit
commitments do so because they are in financial difficulty resulting from
a change in circumstance or living long term on a low income...... These

12Donna McKenzie Skene & Adrian Walters, "Consumer Bankruptcy Law Reform in Great

Britain" (2007) 20 Am. Bank. L.J. 101 at 127.
"' United Kingdom, Department for Constitutional Affairs, "A Choice of Paths: better
options to manage over-indebtedness and multiple debt" (Consultation Paper CP 23/04) (20 July 2004),
online: <http:/Avww.dca.gov.uk/consult/debt/debt.pdf> ["Choice of Paths"].
"' "Can't pay" in this context refers to debtors who cannot pay off their debts as opposed to
debtors who cannot pay trustee fees.
" "Choice of Paths," supra note 113 at 43.
6

11 Ibid.
117

United Kingdom, The Insolvency Service, "Relief for the Indebted-An Alternative to

Bankruptcy (March 2005), online: <http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/
condocregister/consultationpaperwithnewannexl.pdf> at 5 ["Relief for the Indebted"].
118
Ibid.
"9 Ibid.at 18.

120
Ibid.at 12.

" Nicola Dominy & Elaine Kempson, "Can't Pay or Won't Pay?: A Review of Creditor and
Debtor Approaches to the Non-Payment of Bills" (United Kingdom: University of Bristol & Department
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debtors simply lack the money to make payments on time, and include
people with low incomes who face unexpected expenditures; people who
have had a sudden substantial fall in income, leaving them unable to meet
all their commitments; and people with mental health problems that
impair their ability to manage their finances.122 In England and Wales, the
current fee to petition for bankruptcy is UK,310,12 3 even if the debtor
qualifies for remission of or exemption from court fees. The current fee
for administering bankruptcy is UKf1,625.124 Ideally, a DCA report notes,
each bankruptcy estate should cover the costs of its administration.
However, this does not always occur, with the result that bankruptcies
where there are assets subsidize those where there are none. Waiving the
UK£310 fee, the report argues, would mean that cross-subsidization
between cases would increase. 1"
The NINA scheme proposed by the paper would be operated by
Official Receivers, who would be responsible for making debt relief
orders that would result in debtors being discharged from their debts
after a period of one year. The procedure would require an upfront
entry fee, but less than the deposit required to initiate bankruptcy
proceedings. As well, debtors would have to meet certain criteria to make
use of the scheme. 126 The consultation paper proposed a restriction on the
number of times a person could apply for an order, and recommended
the use of an approved intermediary to collect information about the
debtor's affairs, assist in filling out forms, and filter unsuitable
applicants.'2 7 To balance the rights of creditors, the paper suggested a

of Constitutional Affairs, 2003), online: <http:/Avww.pfrc.bris.ac.uk/publications/creditdebt/Reports/cant
paywontpay.pdf>.
122 Ibid
/23

Given an exchange rate of 2.1333 (for 1 July 2007), the equivalent of the UKL310 fee in

Canadian dollars would be $661. Exchange rate: Bank of Canada, Dailynoon rates,supra note 53.
124 "Refief for the Indebted," supra note 117 at 13. Given an exchange rate of 2.1333 (for 1 July
2007), the equivalent of the UKfl,625 fee in Canadian dollars would be $3,467. Exchange rate: Bank of
Canada, Daily noon rates supra note 53.
1"Relief
for the Indebted," ibid
/25 See ibid at 25-28 for possible entry criteria: total liabilities of less than UK£15,000, a
surplus income of no more than UK£50 per month after necessary living expenses, and no realizable
assets over UK0300. Given an exchange rate of 2.3876 (for 1 March 2005, when the report was published)
and Average Annual Rate of Inflation/% Decline in the Value of Money of 2.31 the equivalent figures
would be: maximum liabilities (UKf15,000) =$37,489; maximum surplus income per month (UK5O) =
$125; and maximum realizable assets (UK.300) = $749. Exchange rate: Bank of Canada, Daily noon
rates; supranote 53; inflation: Bank of Canada, Inflation Calculator,supranote 19.
127Ibid at 23.
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means for creditors to object to the making of an order on various
grounds, such as failure to disclose assets, income, or liabilities.2 8 The
scheme would preserve the ultimate right of appeal to the courts.
After the consultation paper was published and comments
received, the Insolvency Service published a second paper highlighting
the.responses. 2 9 The paper put forth the following recommendations: 3 '
- an upfront, non-refundable fee paid by debtor to administer the debt
order relief scheme of no more than UK 100;'
- an administrative order, without the intervention of the courts;
- a restriction on the number of times a debtor can obtain an order (no
more than once every six years);
- the use of an approved intermediary by the debtor when applying for
an order, with intermediaries to be properly funded;
- a cap on permitted liabilities of UKf15,000;132
- a cap on surplus income of UKf50'3 3 per month, with surplus income
determined through a common financial statement and with the
ability to review the cap so it can be amended if appropriate;
34 but kept under review so it can be
- an asset limit at UK£300,
amended if appropriate; and
'28Ibid.at

31.
United Kingdom, The Insolvency Service, Relief for the Indebted-an alternative to
bankruptcy: Summary of Responses and Government Rep4y (November 2005), online:
<http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/con-do-register/relieffortheindebted
analternativetobankruptcyresponse.pdf> [Relieffor the Indebted Responses & Reply].
30
1 Ibid, at 5-7.
"-i For further detail, see ibid at 12-13. Given an exchange rate of 2.0739 (for 1 November
2005, when the report was published) and Average Annual Rate of Inflation/% Decline in the Value of
Money of 2.31 the equivalent in 2007 Canadian dollars would be $217. Exchange rate: Bank of Canada,
Dailynoon rates supranote 53; inflation: Bank of Canada, Inflation Calculator,supranote 19.
32
The paper recommends that secured debt be included for the purposes of ascertaining the
level of liabilities; the position of secured creditors would not be affected, as they would retain their
security. Relief for the Indebted Responses & Reply, supra note 129 at 22. Given an exchange rate of
2.0739 (for 1 November 2005, when the report was published) and Average Annual Rate of Inflation/%
Decline in the Value of Money of 2.31 the equivalent in 2007 Canadian dollars would be $32,564.
Exchange rate: Bank of Canada, Daily noon rates supra note 53; inflation: Bank of Canada, Inflation
Calculator,supranote 19.
" Given an exchange rate of 2.0739 (for 1 November 2005, when the report was published)
and Average Annual Rate of Inflation/% Decline in the Value of Money of 2.31 the equivalent in 2007
Canadian dollars would be $109. Exchange rate: Bank of Canada, Daily noon rates; supra note 53;
inflation: Bank of Canada, Inflation Calculator,supranote 19.
134
Given an exchange rate of 2.0739 (for 1 November 2005, when the report was published)
and Average Annual Rate of Inflation/% Decline in the Value of Money of 2.31 the equivalent in 2007
Canadian dollars would be $651. Exchange rate: Bank of Canada, Daily noon rates supra note 53;
inflation: Bank of Canada, Inflation Calculator,supranote 19.
129
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- provision for an appropriate range of remedies to tackle misconduct
by the debtor.'35
More recently, the British government has put forward
recommendations for the other option identified in the 2004 report: the
availability of a court-based debt-relief order. Instead of implementing
such an order, however, the DCA has advocated the administrative NINA
scheme, deeming the court-based option not cost effective for "can't
pay" debtors.1 36 These reforms are encompassed in the draft Tribunals,
Courts and Enforcement Bill as a means to provide debt relief for
people in the United Kingdom who cannot access currently available
137
remedies, and who have no way to pay what they owe.
An annex to the bill outlines the various options considered by
the UK government for "can't pay" debtors: removing the requirement
for people without assets or surplus income to pay a deposit when
presenting a petition for bankruptcy, persuading creditors to voluntarily
write off debt where there is no prospect that the debt will be paid
within a reasonable amount of time, or introducing legislation to enable
poor people who are financially excluded to access a system of debt
relief. 38 Preferring a legislative response, the report suggests that the
proposal for the NINA scheme would benefit the indebted individual in
terms of reduced stress and the effect on health accompanying it, 39
provide an opportunity for a fresh start, allow him or her to "learn to
manage their finances in more favourable circumstances,"' 4 and free up
court time in cases where creditors are pursuing enforcement action
where there is no hope of repayment. 4 ' The DCA anticipates that the
scheme will entail initial set-up costs, but with an upfront fee (less than
current bankruptcy deposit), it will be possible to meet ongoing

35

See Relief for the Indebted Responses & Reply, supranote 129 at31-35 for further detail;
see also Skene & Walters, supranote 112 at 129.
'-6United Kingdom, Department for Constitutional Affairs, "Explanatory Notes" annexed to the
(Draft) Tnbunal Courts and Enforcement Bill (25 July 2006), online: <http:/Aww.official-documents.
co.uk/document/cm68/6885/6885.pdf> [(Draft) Trbunals, Courts andEnforcementBill] 82 at 109.
"' United Kingdom, The Insolvency Service, "Plans to Bring Debt Relief to the Socially
Excluded," n.d., online: <http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/intermediaries
workingroup/debtrelief.htm >.
'1s"Debt Relief Orders" in (Draft) Tribunals,Courts and EnforcementBll supra note 136,
112 at 117-18.
39Ibid at 126.
140Ibid.
141
Ibid.at 127.
'
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administration costs. 4 The DCA predicts the number of people who will
use the NINA scheme would plateau at between 34,000 to 36,000 after two
years, and that number will increase or decrease with the number of
bankruptcies after that point.'43 Approximately 11% of people currently
presenting a bankruptcy petition would be eligible for the new scheme.' 44
The scheme, the DCA predicts, will apply to a substantial portion of those
seeking advice for debt related problems, who owe less than the proposed
liability cap of UK£15,000 and who are not homeowners.'45 The NINA
procedure is not currently in effect in the United Kingdom.
The proposed NINA procedure in the United Kingdom responds
to a situation more similar to the Canadian system than the New
Zealand system. That is, bankruptcy is currently a high-cost process that
is not accessible to poor debtors in the United Kingdom. The NINA
procedure does not seek to mimic the Australian or mainstream New
Zealand models by adding additional restrictive discharge conditions as
a trade-off for low-cost access to the system. Rather, the NINA
procedure represents a recognition that legislative action is required to
provide a low-cost option for bankruptcy for "poor debtors."
As will be seen in the discussion that follows, while the debates
in both the United Kingdom and New Zealand that informed the
reform process in these jurisdiction is significant for our analysis, we do
not see the need to create a new NINA stream in order to improve access
to the bankruptcy system for poor debtors in Canada.
VI.

POSSIBLE MODELS FOR THE CANADIAN BANKRUPTCY
SYSTEM

The most problematic aspect of the current Canadian system is
that-depending on where they live-poor debtors in Canada face
different prospects for accessing the bankruptcy system, and face
different costs for doing so. In each trustee interview, drawing on the
Australian model, we suggested an option that would see poor debtors
fill out a simple set of forms and then go to a kiosk in the local shopping
mall where the forms and supporting documents could be filed and the

42
1

Ibid.at 129-30.

4.7Ibid.at

115.

Ibid.at 127.
145 Ibid.at 115.
144
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bankruptcy accomplished. We also discussed a variant in which a trustee
(or other qualified insolvency professional) might assess the debtor's
case before he or she was eligible to use the kiosk. None of the trustees
interviewed thought that either option was a good idea.
A.

Trustees' Views on PossibleModels

1.

Unanimously Against a Government-Operated System

Perhaps not surprisingly, the private trustees that we interviewed
were unanimous in rejecting the idea of a new government-funded and
government-staffed program that would handle the bankruptcies of
poor debtors. Several recognized that their opposition would be
expected, given that any new government-provided service would
compete with their own practice. However, it seems clear that their
opposition goes beyond simple self-interest.
The trustees agreed that a trained professional should be closely
involved in order to handle unexpected situations. One noted that the
"trustee learns more about the cases over the nine months, [through]
information that would not be available at the time of application." '46 With
this in mind, all of the trustees we spoke to expressed the belief that a
government program would require one of two unpalatable staffing
options. One option would involve the training of a completely new cadre
of insolvency professionals to replace the work now done by trustees. The
trustees saw little benefit in training a new group to undertake work that
they themselves have been trained to do. A second option would be to use
less-qualified staff, on the assumption that poor debtors will have simple
bankruptcy cases; the trustees thought that such staff would not be able to
handle the issues that often arise even in simple cases. Several harked back
to the days of Federal Insolvency Trustee Agency (FITA), which seems to be
universally reviled as having failed because of the incompetence of its
staff.147 One said that there are "lots of horror stories from FITA. Files that
146Interview with Trustee 2, supranote 17.
47

' The federal government introduced FITA in 1972 to provide services for those debtors who
could not afford a trustee. By 1977, between one third and one half of bankruptcies proceeded under
FITA. The program was discontinued in 1979: Igor Livshits, "Accounting for the Rise in Consumer
Bankruptcies in Canada and the United States" by Igor Livshits, James McGee & Mich~le Tertilt (Paper
presented to the York University Department of Economic Seminar Series 2005-2006, 9 March 2005)
[unpublished], online: York University Department of Economics <http://dept.econ.yorku.ca/seminars/
2004-2005/BankruptcyRise.pdf>. Despite the oft-heard opinion that FITA was disastrous because
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never got closed, people not getting real assets."' 48 Another believed that
"the government employees [of FITA] were not qualified [to administer
bankruptcies]."' 4 9 Still another asserted that "the system collapsed because
the government was not equipped to handle it and debtors were not
advised properly" and that "debtors were not discharged [because] the
system was not tracking them." 5 '
2.

Unanimously Against Making Access Too Easy

The trustees we interviewed had either participated in a BAP
case or worked on a number of files with less than $500 in receipts. All
but one were working in firms in which a large part of the work was in
consumer bankruptcy, and all showed considerable understanding and
sympathy for the plight of poor debtors. Nonetheless, even these
trustees were emphatic that bankruptcy should not be made too easy.
Their view was that the absence of significant barriers would lead to the
abuse of credit and to the abuse of the bankruptcy system.
Apart from their staffing the trustees felt that the kiosk option (or
any sort of "car wash" form of bankruptcy) would not provide enough
rehabilitation (such as they believe arises from mandatory bankruptcy
counselling). A system that allowed too easy a discharge would not teach
the debtor any lessons about the misuse of credit and would presumably
lead to repeated credit trouble. One trustee felt that counselling made
debtors face their responsibility for incurring the debts that led to the
152
15
bankruptcy, and thought that bankruptcy "shouldn't be a wash." ' Others
were concerned that the debtors would not learn anything if the procedure
13
was too simple: "They need to learn something so they don't come back."'
Another thought that in the current system, "the debtors have
responsibilities-to get counselling, to report changes in their situation, to
' 54
make monthly payments, to turn over their financial affairs to the trustee." 1

bankruptcies were mishandled by incompetent or poorly trained staff, we have seen no documentary
evidence of the shortcomings of FITA.
148 Interview with Truste 8, 8 September 2006.
11 Interview with Trustee 3, supra note 23.
'oInterview
Interview
t Interview
'-'-Interview
'

'is

Ibid.

with Trustee
with Trustee
with Trustee
with Trustee

1, supra note 4.
8, supranote 148.
5, supranote 3; Interview with Trustee 3, supranote 23.
5, ibid.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

3.

[VOL. 45, No. 3

Recent Canadian Reform Efforts

During the deliberations of the Canadian Personal Insolvency
Task Force (PITF), a subgroup was assigned to address issues around the
"administration process." The subgroup quickly became focused on the
idea of creating a "fast track" process for the many bankruptcy files that
are quite simple, because they involve no significant assets and offer
little prospect of creditors receiving any significant dividends. A key
decision, made without extensive open discussion, was that the "fast
track" process would lie within the existing Canadian bankruptcy
system, and not require a public trustee as in the Australian case. In a
discussion on the Australian system, the subgroup wrote that, given the
current Canadian system, a shift to a system with the role of trustee
' 55
filled by a public actor would be "politically unfeasible.'
The definition of eligibility for the "fast track" process was not
based on any notion of the need for low-cost bankruptcy services. The
subgroup mentioned that there are no reliable data suggesting that
there is an issue with access to bankruptcy for poor debtors, 156 and one
member questioned whether the subgroup should address affordability
at all.'57 In addition, the subgroup (and the PITF as a whole) decided not
to tackle the controversial issue of the fees charged by the trustees,
which are currently set by trustees within the framework of Rule
128(1).158 There was some debate within the subgroup as to whether
competition would help to decrease fees, and some group members felt
that advertising fees would help resolve this issue. Ultimately, however,
the subgroup did not create any concrete recommendations on the issue.
The Canadian Association of Insolvency Professionals (CAIRP)
and Insolvency Institute of Canada (1IC) made a joint submission to the
Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce.' 59 That
submission acknowledged that the dissenting members of the PITF raised
several issues in respect of access to the process that require further
' 5 5 "Preliminary Draft #2" (PITF subgroup deliberations, 27 November 2000) [unpublished,
document on file with the authors] at 6.
156 Ibid.at 9.
157 John Eisner quoted in "Record of Decision From Conference Call" (PITF subgroup
deliberations, 15 November 2000) [unpublished].
'See Part III, above, for a more detailed discussion.

' CAIRP/IIC, "Submission on Personal Insolvency Reform" (March 2003), online:
<http:/Avww.cairp.ca/pdf/Mar262003.pdf> at 68-69.
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investigation and study, including how the costs of an alternative process
would be covered, how access for such debtors would be increased
through any alternative process, and how the integrity of the system
would be maintained or enhanced. CAIRP/IIC made two recommendations
in respect of access to information and assistance to debtors with no
assets and no income. First, it recommended that there be increased
information provided to debtors about their options, including the trustee
referral program. The submission also recommended that the OSB
increase the information it disseminates, and "address issues such as
garnishees and how to get them lifted or reduced; how to stop harassing
phone calls from collection agencies; strategies to deal with temporary
layoffs and salary reductions; and key telephone numbers through which
to access these remedies and other public agencies."' 60
Neither of the CAIRP/IIC recommendations was adopted in the
Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and
62
Commerce.6 ' The Senate Report did not address trustee fees directly.1
However, unlike the PITF subgroup, the Senate Report recognized that
"access to the bankruptcy system is increasingly compromised for lowit did not recommend reforms
asset, low-income debtors," although
163
process.
NINA
a
adopting
such as
Most recently, Statute c. 4 716 provides for the following new
section (section 156.1) to allow bankrupts to enter into an agreement to
pay for the trustee's fees after the bankruptcy period:
An individual bankrupt who has never before been bankrupt under the laws of Canada
or of any prescribed jurisdiction and who is not required to make payments under section
68 to the estate of the bankrupt may enter into an agreement with the trustee to pay the
trustee's fees and disbursements if the total amount required to be paid under the
agreement is not more than the prescribed amount and that total amount is to be paid
bankrupt's discharge. The agreement
before the expiry of the 12-month period after the
65
may be enforced after the bankrupt's discharge.

'l/bidat 69.
16!Canada, Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, "Debtors
arid Creditors Sharing the Burden: A Review of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the
Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act' (November 2003), online: Senate of Canada, Banking,
Trade and Commerce Committee <http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/2/parlbus/commbus/senate/come/bank-e/rep-e/bankruptcy-e.pdf> [Senate Report].
162 bid.
'63bid.at 168.
" Statute c. 47, supra note 14.

" Statute c. 47, ibid.; Canada, Industry Canada, Corporate and Insolvency Law Policy "BIA:
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The clause-by-clause briefing notes that this new section is intended:
to provide a mechanism which will enhance accessibility to the insolvency system for
individuals who do not have surplus income and who may otherwise have difficulty paying
the costs associated with the administration of a bankruptcy. In some circumstances,
especially bankruptcies with small estates, it is difficult for a person to find a trustee willing
to act for them because the trustees require payment for their services. If the estate is too
small, no trustee will act. This has the effect of leaving the vulnerable person without
professional assistance during a difficult experience. By providing that the bankrupt may
pay for the trustee's services after the bankruptcy period, the reform should ensure that
more people get the assistance they need. Balancing this reform is the limit on fees that can
be charged by a trustee pursuant to the rules.'6

The possibility of deferring trustee fees may assist access to the
bankruptcy process. However, it represents an intrusion into the fresh
start for a particular group of debtors, which may include the group we
define as poor debtors, who cannot afford the cost of bankruptcy.
VII.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In this penultimate section of the paper, we propose three sets
of recommendations. Each set of recommendations addresses the two
principal flaws we believe are present in the current Canadian system:
- No national or even local uniformity exists in the treatment of poor
debtors.
- Poor debtors face informational and financial barriers that may impede
equal access to the fresh start provided by bankruptcy.
Within each set of our recommendations, some may be
implemented quite quickly and with limited cost. Others will take longer
to implement and will require additional consultation and funding. In
particular, further review will be necessary to determine the exact
budgetary implications of our recommendations.
The two flaws highlighted by our research do not lead us to
recommend the adoption of a separate bankruptcy scheme for poor
debtors or NINA debtors. Instead, we recommend that Canada adopt a BAP
system that eliminates the out-of-pocket costs for poor debtors. These costs
could be eliminated with a combination of fee waivers (e.g., waiving the

Administration of Estates" in Bill C-55. clause-by-clause analysis. An Act to establish the Wage
Earner Protection Program Act, to amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Companies'
Creditors Arrangement Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, (n.d.), online:
<http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/ epic/internet/incilp-pdci.nsf/en/clO0813e.html>.
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OSB'S filing fee) and government subsidy (e.g., having the OSB pay for the
mandatory counselling sessions). A BAP system that demands no out-ofpocket payments by poor debtors would address the financial barriers
they face. To deal with the informational barriers, we recommend the
creation of an impartial agency that provides advice and support to poor
debtors trying to deal with collection efforts. We recognize that, in some
instances, bankruptcy might not be the appropriate solution for poor
debtors and that other options should be available to deal with creditor
aggression. By making the judgment-proof status of poor debtors clear,
such advice and support provided by an impartial agency would limit the
number of debtors who use the bankruptcy process. Finally, to increase
the uniformity and certainty of bankruptcy across the country, we
propose a method for creating parity while encouraging the voluntary
agreements among trustees that exist in some cities.
In addition to the trustee interviews, our recommendations are
informed by the analysis found in our comparative account in Part V of
this article. In particular, we believe that the situation in New Zealand
and Australia provides low-cost access to the bankruptcy process but we
do not agree with corresponding to changes to the system that make the
process more burdensome for "poor debtors." At the same time, we are
persuaded by the arguments in favour of eliminating fees made as part
of the reform process in the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and
the United Kingdom.
A.

Reform of BAP Regulations

Our research suggests that a thorough revision of the rules
governing the operation of the BAP system is necessary. Our review- of
the program suggests that the following changes are highly desirable.
RECOMMENDATION 1:

Widespread and improved publicity of the BAP is required.
One reason for the infrequent use of the BAP is that the OSB has
made no systematic efforts to make its existence known to poor debtors.
Much more information on the operation of the BAP system should be
made easily accessible to debtors and trustees. Detailed information on
the BAP should be provided to poverty clinics, credit counsellors, and
trustees. The information on the OSB website related to the BAP should
be updated and improved. The information is difficult to find, and does
not give a balanced and accurate sense of the program. For example, the
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website currently gives the impression that the BAP requires pro bono
167
work by trustees.
2:
A clear eligibility standard for the BAP should be put into place.
RECOMMENDATION

Further consultation should be undertaken to determine the exact
nature of a new BAP-eligibility standard. Based on our research to date, we
recommend a standard involving low current income and a long-term
history of receipt of government transfers. Using low current income alone
might lead to abuse by debtors who only temporarily have low income. The
appropriate requirement might be that eligible debtors must be in receipt
of government transfers (such as income assistance, unemployment
insurance, or disability benefits) for twelve of the previous eighteen months.
The critique of the New Zealand model presented by Brown and Telfer
warns against moving to a standard for eligibility that allows for any
significant degree of subjectivity.'68 In addition, some form of procedural
fairness will need to be built into such a bright-line eligibility standard. For
example, appeals should be allowed by claimants whose status as "poor
debtors" is recent but likely to be permanent, e.g. by reason of disability.
Under this new eligibility standard, the requirement that debtors
must visit two trustees to qualify for the BAP should be eliminated. This
requirement imposes an additional barrier to bankruptcy that higher
income debtors do not face. The current requirement has a detrimental
impact on women in particular, as they must often find care for their
children as they move around the city obtaining opinions from two trustees.
3:
Fees for debtors who qualify for the BAP should be waived.
RECOMMENDATION

Ideally, poor debtors should be able to file for bankruptcy
without paying any of the out-of-pocket costs. Receipts from tax refunds
would remain in the estate, as would any proceeds from the sale of nonexempt assets. The fee waiver could be financed by a combination of
OSB waivers, OSB payments to trustees for counselling, or pro bono work
by trustees. Further consultation needs to be done with trustees,
combined with a careful cost analysis by the OSB, in order to determine

6

1

'The information is limited to "Directive No. 11," supranote 25.
Supranote 94.
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the ideal solution. In the interim, we recommend that the $75 filing fee
be eliminated, and that the OSB cover the cost of both counselling
sessions. The high mean level of fees in BAP cases means that trustees
can recover significant amounts without voluntary payments.
RECOMMENDATION 4:
The BAP should provide

that the OSB will file the bankruptcy as a last resort.

The regulations (and the expanded publicity recommended
above) should indicate the OSB's commitment to ensuring that the
bankruptcy will be filed in a timely fashion even if no private trustee is
forthcoming, and even if an OSB official must administer the bankruptcy.
B.

Working Toward Uniformity

In comparison to the other jurisdictions considered, the issue of
uniformity appears to be a uniquely Canadian issue. Poor debtors
throughout Canada should have access to the reformed BAP. However,
our interviews suggested that trustees are not happy with the existing
BAP and, where possible, prefer to rely on voluntary agreements among
ar'ea trustees or on the goodwill of individual trustees. At least until the
reformed BAP can gain the confidence of trustees, we recommend that
the voluntary agreements among trustees be encouraged and perhaps
expanded in scope. However, these voluntary systems should be at least
as affordable as BAP. A first step would be to assess the extent of the
geographic coverage of the agreements. CAIRP could become involved
by surveying its members to make an inventory of such agreements.
Second, the OSB should keep track of files where receipts are low to see
if they are spread, in a representative way, across the country.169
RECOMMENDATION 5:

The OSB should establish, by directive, a system for registering cityspecific fee agreements reached by trustees.
While we believe that the voluntary agreements should be
encouraged, we also think the OSB should make sure that it is aware of all
such agreements and ensure that the terms of the agreements are
69

' To aid in this effort, the Statements of Receipts and Disbursements should be modified so
that voluntary payments are shown in a uniform way. As explained in Appendix Ill, the current form does
not allow all voluntary payments to be identified.
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consistent with the aim of the reformed BAP: ease of access and low outof-pocket costs to the debtor. In the end, it is not obvious whether it will
be better to have only a reformed BAP, only a set of voluntary agreements,
or a combination of the two. Informed decision making about the need
for the BAP can only be made if a close watch is kept on the operation of
the voluntary agreements.
C.

ImpartialAgency

RECOMMENDATION 6:
An impartial agency should be created to give poor debtors advice on
how to deal with their debt.
Currently, Canadian debtors have no place to turn for impartial
debt advice. Debtors can seek advice from credit counselling services,
but these are either financed by creditors or are for-profit, fee-charging
entities; most require 100% repayment. 70 Trustees are another possible
source of advice, but they have a clear incentive to recommend
bankruptcy. The creation of a neutral agency that provides advice on
debtors' rights vis-h-vis their creditors and suggests the most appropriate
remedy is recommended. We recommend the creation of an impartial
debt advice agency in two to three pilot sites in the short term.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have examined the question of whether poor
debtors-defined as those who have very low income and few prospects
for higher future income-need greater access to bankruptcy. Our
answer is that they do, despite the fact that most are judgment-proof,
despite the fact that trustees in some cities have banded together to
address their needs, and despite the fact that the OSB's BAP system exists
to serve their needs. First, poor debtors' need greater access to
bankruptcy because their judgment-proof status does not, in practice,
prevent aggressive collection efforts and will end if they are ever to
escape poverty. Second, the efforts of trustees are limited to a few cities,

170 The Office of Consumer Affairs recently published a study of credit counselling which

highlights the lack of regulation of that industry and its potential bias. Saul Schwartz, "Counselling the
Overindebted: A Comparative Perspective" (2005), online: Office of the Superintendent in Bankruptcy
<http //strategis.ic.gcca/epic/site/bsf-osb.nsf/vwapj/Schwartz-2005-ENG.pdf/$FHLE/Schwartz-2005-ENG.pdf>.
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meaning that there is no uniformity of treatment across the country:
And, finally, the BAP is little used and in need of significant reform.
To help those poor debtors who may need greater access, we
advance three sets of recommendations. The most important of these is
that the out-of-pocket costs of bankruptcy (the $75 filing fee and the
$180 cost of the two mandatory counselling sessions) be waived for poor
debtors, defined in this paper by low income and a history of reliance on
government transfers. Since it is common for tax refunds to generate
significant receipts for the estates even of poor debtors, there may be
trustees who are willing to handle the files of poor debtors once the outof-pocket costs are waived. Accordingly, we recommend that the OSB
undertake to be the trustee of last resort, and handle files that private
trustees are unwilling to take on.
Finally, poor debtors not only face financial barriers to
bankruptcy but also informational barriers. We therefore recommend
the creation of an impartial debt advice service that could help
overcome these barriers and, in addition, help debtors at all income
levels avoid over-indebtedness.
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APPENDIX I: DESCRIPTION OF TRUSTEE INTERVIEWS
Trustee 1 Trustee 1 works in Montreal in a mid-market, regional charteredaccounting and consulting firm with offices in Toronto and Montreal. She
has recently moved offices, and the exact number of files and division of
consumer/commercial files is not yet available. The primary target market
for the firm is privately held companies ranging from $10 million in
revenues to complex organizations with annual revenues of $150 million.
Trustee 2

Trustee 2 works in the Windsor area, administering approximately 100
bankruptcy files per year. 95% of her business encompasses consumer
bankruptcies.

Trustee 3

Trustee 3 is a sole practitioner in Edmonton, having previously worked
for large accounting firms and other sole practitioners. She has a social
work background. Her practice is composed entirely of consumer
bankruptcies, administering about 250 files per year. She has twenty
years of experience in the bankruptcy field.

Trustee 4

Trustee 4 is member of a mid-size accounting firm in Toronto where
he heads the insolvency division. He has been in practice since the
early 1980s, formerly with large accounting firms. He is a specialist in
both corporate and personal bankruptcy, providing consulting services
to both debtors and creditors.

Trustee 5 Trustee 5 is a sole practitioner in London (Ontario). His firm primarily
administers consumer bankruptcies, with 95% of the business focusing
on consumer files.
Trustee 6

Trustee 6 works in Halifax, in an office of four trustees; he specializes
in the areas of financial restructuring, receivership, and bankruptcy.
Trustee 6's firm undertakes both corporate and consumer
bankruptcies, handling about 500 consumer bankruptcies each year.

Trustee 7 Trustee'7 works for a small firm with offices in Toronto, Kingston, and
Brockville. The business handles mostly consumer files, approximately
400 per year. He has worked as a trustee for ten years.
Trustee

8 Trustee 8 has worked six of her eleven years as a trustee in private
practice. She currently handles bankruptcy files in the Greater Toronto
Area, administering approximately 400 bankruptcies each year.

Trustee 9 Trustee 9 works at a national firm in Ottawa.
Bankrupt

This poor debtor (under our definition) has been through the bankruptcy
system two times. The second time she was assigned into bankruptcy it
was under the BAP program. She was referred to us by her BAP trustee.
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APPENDIX 11: BIA, RULE 128(1)
Also, see OSB Circular 2,171 which was introduced in 1999 and imposes the $10,000
maximum.
TRUSTEE'S FEES AND DISBURSEMENTS IN SUMMARY ADMINISTRATION
128.
(1) The fees of the trustee for services performed in a summary
administration are calculated on the total receipts remaining after
deducting necessary disbursements relating directly to the realization
of the property of the bankrupt, and the payments to secured
creditors, according to the following percentages:
(a) 100 per cent on the first $975 or less of receipts;
(b) 35 per cent on the portion of the receipts exceeding $975 but
not exceeding $2,000; and
(c) 50 per cent on the portion of the receipts exceeding $2,000.
(2) A trustee in a summary administration may claim, in addition to the
amount set out in subsection (1),
(a) the costs of counselling referred to in subsection 131(2);
(b) the fee for filing an assignment referred to in paragraph
132(a);
(c) the fee payable to the registrar under paragraph 1(a) of Part II
of the schedule;
(d) the amount of applicable federal and provincial taxes for
goods and services; and
(e) a lump sum of $100 in respect of administrative
disbursements.
(3) A trustee in a summary administration may withdraw from the bank
account used in administering the estate of the bankrupt, as an
advance on the amount set out in subsection (1),
(a) $250, at the time of the mailing of the notice of bankruptcy;
(b) an additional $250, thirty days after the date of the
bankruptcy; and
.(c) an additional $250, four months after the date of the
bankruptcy.
(4) Subsections (1) to (3) apply to bankruptcies in respect of which
proceedings are commenced on or after September 30, 1997 and the
accounts are taxed on or after April 30, 1998.

'7' Canada, OSB, Circular No. 2, "Summary Administration Estates With Realizable Assets
Exceeding $10,000" (16 September 1999), online: Strategis <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/site/bsfosb.nsf/en/br0l101 e.html>.
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APPENDIX III: NOTES ON DATA
The data analysis reported at several points in the text was conducted by the
Business Intelligence Centre (BIC) of the OSB. The statistical analysis of consumer
bankruptcy was greatly eased by the advent of electronic filing on 1 January 2002;
most documents related to consumer bankruptcies are now electronically submitted
and can be analyzed quickly and accurately.
Two factors determined our choice of a dafa file on which to base our
analysis. First, our analysis was concerned with trustee fees, so we needed a sample
of bankruptcies that had electronically submitted Statements of Receipts and
Disbursements (SRD). The SRD shows all receipts and disbursements arising from a
consumer bankruptcy, including trustee fees, voluntary payments by debtors and
dividends disbursed to the creditors. The trustee typically submits the SRD to the
OSB at least nine months after the bankruptcy is filed, close to the date when the
bankruptcy file is closed. Second, most bankruptcies filed by poor debtors will be
summary administration cases so we wanted to limit the analysis to such files.
These two factors led us to choose to analyze all summary administration
bankruptcies for which an SRD was electronically submitted between 1 January 2006
to 31 December 2006. According to BIC, there were 29,279 such bankruptcies
available for analysis.
Note that these are not all summary administration bankruptcies filed in
the calendar year 2006. Because of the lag between the filing of a bankruptcy and
the submission of an SRD months (and possibly years) later, many of the
bankruptcies that we analyze will have been filed in calendar 2005 (and, for a small
number, in 2004). Furthermore, we are looking only at SRDS submitted
electronically. Nonetheless, we do not expect that substantial bias is introduced by
our use of electronically submitted SRDS. Finally, not all of the bankruptcies in our
analytic file were closed in calendar 2006. After the trustee submits the SRD, the
OSB sends the trustee a letter of comment approving the closing of the file. For that
reason, not all bankruptcies for which an SRD was received in the calendar year
2006 will have been closed in the calendar year 2006.
All of the statistical information in this paper was generated by BIC using
the 29,279 electronically filed cases with SRDS. Many variables, including the
dividend paid to creditors and the level of trustee fees, can be accurately derived
from the electronically filed cases. However, the value of voluntary payments made
by the debtor to the trustee must be estimated because trustees are not required to
report such payments in a consistent fashion. Most trustees, however, report them
by noting their existence in the SRD. For example, a particular dollar amount in the
receipt portion of the SRD might be identified as "voluntary payment" or "payment
by debtor." In some cases, however, voluntary payments will have been made but
there is no way to identify them on the SRD.

